



2026 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OPINION POLL

ROUND 2 ELECTION OPINION POLL REPORT

*Public attitudes, voting intention, candidate prospects and coalition dynamics
National findings with Round 1–Round 2, gender, age-group and regional
analysis*

August 21, 2026

Table of Contents

<u>ABOUT THIS REPORT</u>	<u>4</u>
<u>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</u>	<u>4</u>
A CRUCIAL DISTINCTION: SUPPORT VS EXPECTED VICTORY	4
VERIFICATION OF THE BEST-CHANCE RESULT	5
<u>HEADLINE FINDINGS.....</u>	<u>5</u>
<u>1. INTRODUCTION AND ELECTORAL CONTEXT</u>	<u>5</u>
1.3 OBJECTIVES.....	6
<u>2. METHODOLOGY AND DATA QUALITY</u>	<u>7</u>
2.1 SURVEY DESIGN AND COVERAGE	7
2.2 DATA COLLECTION AND QUALITY ASSURANCE	7
2.3 DATA PROCESSING AND ANALYSIS.....	7
2.4 ROUND COMPARISON	8
2.5 VERIFICATION OF ROUND-SPECIFIC RESULTS.....	8
2.6 INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS.....	8
<u>3. SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE</u>	<u>8</u>
3.1 HOW THE RESULTS SHOULD BE READ	12
<u>4. VOTER PARTICIPATION AND ISSUE-BASED VOTING.....</u>	<u>12</u>
4.1 INTENDED PARTICIPATION IN THE 2026 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION	12
<u>GENDER ANALYSIS.....</u>	<u>ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.</u>
<u>5. PRESIDENT BARROW: THIRD TERM AND VOTING PROSPECTS.....</u>	<u>16</u>
<u>5.2 ELECTORAL SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT BARROW’S POSSIBLE 2026 CANDIDACY ...</u>	<u>20</u>
<u>6. OUSAINOU DARBOE: CANDIDACY AND VOTING PROSPECTS</u>	<u>23</u>
<u>6.2VOTER SUPPORT FOR OUSAINOU DARBOE IN THE 2026 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION</u>	<u>27</u>
<u>7. COALITION POLITICS AND LEADERSHIP</u>	<u>30</u>
<u>7.3 PREFERRED LEADERSHIP FOR A PROSPECTIVE POLITICAL COALITION</u>	<u>34</u>

<u>7.4 PROSPECTS OF A UDP-LED COALITION</u>	<u>37</u>
<u>8. VOTING INTENTION AND PERCEIVED FRONTRUNNERS</u>	<u>40</u>
<u>8.1 VOTING INTENTION IF THE ELECTION WERE HELD TODAY.....</u>	<u>40</u>
<u>8.2 PERCEIVED FRONTRUNNERS FOR THE 2026 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.....</u>	<u>42</u>
<u>8.3 VOTING INTENTION VERSUS PERCEIVED ELECTABILITY.....</u>	<u>45</u>
<u>9. CROSS-ROUND COMPARATIVE SYNTHESIS.....</u>	<u>46</u>
<u>9.1 CANDIDATE ACCEPTANCE HAS RISEN FASTER THAN VOTE CONVERSION.....</u>	<u>46</u>
<u>9.2 COALITION CONFIDENCE HAS BECOME MORE CONDITIONAL.....</u>	<u>46</u>
<u>9.3 THE ELECTORATE REMAINS COMPETITIVE AND GEOGRAPHICALLY UNEVEN</u>	<u>46</u>
<u>10. ELECTION OUTLOOK, IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION.....</u>	<u>47</u>
<u>10.1 PRINCIPAL FINDINGS.....</u>	<u>47</u>
<u>10.2 WHAT THE FINDINGS MEAN FOR THE ELECTORAL CONTEST.....</u>	<u>47</u>
<u>10.3 OVERALL ASSESSMENT</u>	<u>48</u>
<u>10.4 CONCLUSION</u>	<u>48</u>
<u>11. GUIDANCE FOR PUBLIC & MEDIA DISSEMINATION</u>	<u>48</u>
<u>APPENDIX: COMPARATIVE INDICATOR VALUES</u>	<u>49</u>

About This Report

This publication presents the second round of the 2026 Presidential Election Opinion Poll conducted by **Gambia Participates (GP)**. It is designed for citizens, civil society organisations, political actors, researchers, development partners and the media to screen through the current political landscape, track citizen sentiments' ahead of the election, monitor candidate performance and compare it with the August 2025 poll published by GP. Its purpose is to make the survey evidence accessible without overstating what an opinion poll can establish.

The report examines intended electoral participation and reasons for possible non-participation; the issues respondents expect to influence their vote; public attitudes towards the possible candidacies of President Adama Barrow and Ousainou Darboe; willingness to vote for each candidate; perceptions of selected opposition coalition arrangements; preferred coalition leadership; present voting intention; and perceptions of which candidate has the best chance of winning. It also compares matched indicators with the August 2025 election poll (Round 1) and examines variation by gender, age group, and Local Government Area.

All results describe opinions expressed at the time of data collection. They are not official election results and should not be presented as a prediction of the final vote. Candidate nominations, alliances, campaign messages, voter turnout, political events and changes among undecided voters may alter the electoral landscape before polling day in December.

Executive Summary

Round 2 portrays a competitive and fluid presidential contest within an electorate reporting high intended participation. President Adama Barrow holds the strongest single-candidate position in both current voting intention and perceived electability, but he does not command majority vote intention. Ousainou Darboe remains the closest challenger nationally, while Talib Bensouda has a significant support base and a particularly visible profile among younger voters. Coalition preferences remain conditional, and undecided or uncertain respondents continue to represent an important part of the electorate.

The analysis is based on 1,556 registered voters in R2 across all 53 electoral constituencies in the eight Local Government Areas (LGAs). Where identical questions were asked in the previous survey, results are compared with R1 from August 2025, which also had 1,556 respondents. National and subgroup calculations were checked against the supplied counts, and gender, age and LGA charts present percentages within each subgroup.

A Crucial Distinction: Support vs Expected Victory

The poll asks respondents who they would vote for if election were to be held today and who they believe has the best chance of winning the 2026 presidential election. These questions measure two separate and different issues, one concerns who the respondents would vote for if elections were to be held today and the other concerns who the respondent **believe** stands a better chance of winning the 2026 election, even if that candidate may not be their preferred candidate. 32% of the respondents said they would vote for Barrow if elections were to be held today while more than half (51%) of the respondents believed Barrow stands a better chance of winning. The difference means that many respondents who do not currently choose Barrow nevertheless expect him to be the strongest contender. The 51% figure must therefore never be described as Barrow's projected vote share.

Verification of the best-chance result

The round-specific analysis shows that President Adama Barrow’s perceived likelihood of winning increased substantially between the two survey rounds. In R1, 481 of the 1,556 respondents, representing 31%, identified him as the candidate with the best chance of winning. In R2, this increased to 792 of the 1,556 respondents, equivalent to 51%.

Perceived electability is different from voting intention. Although 51% of R2 respondents identified Barrow as the candidate with the best chance of winning, 491 respondents, representing 32%, selected him in the current vote-intention question. The difference shows that a section of the electorate perceived Barrow stands a better chance of winning the election without identifying him as its present voting choice.

Measure	Count/base	Result
R1: Barrow judged to have best chance	481 / 1,556	31%
R2: Barrow judged to have best chance	792 / 1,556	51%
R2: respondents intending to vote Barrow	491 / 1,556	32%

Headline findings

- Views on a Barrow **third-term** contest are almost evenly divided in R2: Yes 46%, No 46%, and Not Sure 8%. Support is 11 points higher than in R1.
- When asked about **actual voting intention** for Barrow, 31% say Yes, 54% No and 15% remain undecided. The “Yes” share increased by 12 points from R1 but still trails on “No”.
- Darboe’s candidacy is also closely divided: 46% support him contesting and 45% oppose his candidacy. His direct vote support is lower at 26%, although it increased by 8 points from R1.
- Belief that a Talib Bensouda, Essa Mbaye Faal and Mama Kandeh coalition could win, fell from 55% in R1 to 36% in R2, while “No” is more than doubled.
- A UDP-led coalition is viewed more favourably: 47% say it could win, compared with 33% who say “No”.
- If the election were held today, Adama Barrow leads at 32%, followed by Ousainou Darboe at 25% and Talib Bensouda at 19%; 17% are undecided.
- On perceived electability, Barrow is first at 51%, ahead of Darboe at 23% and Bensouda at 12%.

1. Introduction and Electoral Context

The December 2026 presidential election will be an important moment in The Gambia’s democratic development. Public debate is already centered on the incumbent’s possible candidacy, the continuing role of established opposition leaders, the emergence of alternative contenders, and the prospects for political alliances. These issues are unfolding within a competitive multi-party environment in which national visibility, party conduct and organisation, regional reach, campaign mobilization, messaging and voter participation will shape the character of the contest.

Election opinion polling provides an organised way of measuring how citizens view these developments. It records current attitudes, identifies the relative standing of political actors, highlights the size of undecided groups, and shows how opinions vary across demographic and geographic constituencies. Repeated rounds also allow movements in public opinion to be tracked using comparable questions and consistent measures.

This second-round report presents a detailed account of voter perceptions as the electoral process develops. It goes beyond headline rankings by examining four distinct dimensions of public opinion: acceptance of a candidate entering the race, willingness to vote for that candidate, confidence in possible coalition arrangements, and perceptions of who currently has the best chance of winning. Keeping these dimensions separate provides a clearer and more accurate picture of the political environment.

The report follows the broad presentation style of GP's 2025 poll analysis while strengthening the comparative and interpretive components. It separates four concepts that should not be conflated: whether a candidate should contest, whether respondents would vote for that candidate, whether a coalition could win, and who is perceived to have the best chance of winning. R1 and R2 are compared only where matched information is available. Like R1, R2 findings are disaggregated by gender, age group and LGA.

1.1 Structure of the Report

The report begins with survey design, validation procedures and the achieved sample profile. The substantive findings, then move from candidacy and direct vote support to coalition prospects, current voting intention and perceived electability. Each thematic section presents national results first, followed by round comparison where available and then gender, age and LGA patterns. A cross-round synthesis, implications section and detailed appendix complete the report.

1.2 Purpose of the Opinion Poll

The purpose of the opinion poll is to provide credible, accessible and timely evidence on public attitudes towards the 2026 presidential election. It documents how eligible voters currently assess major candidates and possible coalition arrangements and establishes a consistent basis for monitoring changes in opinion as the election approaches. The report supports informed public discussion by presenting the findings in clear language and by maintaining a strict distinction between personal voting choice and expectations about the likely winner.

1.3 Objectives

- Measure public acceptance of the possible presidential candidacies of Adama Barrow and Ousainou Darboe.
- Assess the proportion of respondents who currently indicate that they would vote for Barrow or Darboe if each contests the election.
- Examine perceptions of the electoral viability and preferred leadership of selected coalition arrangements.
- Measure current voting intention across the principal candidates and the undecided electorate.
- Assess intended electoral participation, the reasons for possible non-participation and the size of the electorate not yet firmly committed to voting.
- Identify the principal policy and service-delivery issues respondents expect to influence their voting decisions.
- Identify the candidate whom respondents believe currently has the best chance of winning.
- Compare matched R1 and R2 indicators and assess the direction and scale of changes between the two rounds.
- Present gender, age-group and LGA patterns to provide a full understanding of the national results by demographic.

1.4 Scope of the Report

The report covers the eight LGAs and presents national, gender, age-group and regional findings for R2. It includes R1–R2 comparisons wherever the same question and response categories are available in both rounds. The substantive scope covers intended participation and potential voter apathy, issue-based voting, candidacy acceptance, direct candidate support, coalition viability, coalition leadership, present voting intention and perceived electability. Socio-demographic statistics describe the achieved sample and provide the basis for interpreting subgroup results.

2. Methodology and Data Quality

2.1 Survey Design and Coverage

The poll used a cross-sectional survey design to capture the views of Gambian citizens aged 18 years and above who reported holding a valid voter's card. Unlike R1, this survey only targets respondents with valid voter's card. Similar to R1, the R2 analytical sample contains 1,556 respondents distributed across Banjul, Kanifing, Brikama, Kerewan, Mansakonko, Kuntaur, Janjanbureh and Basse. Coverage of all eight LGAs makes it possible to present a national overview alongside geographically disaggregated result.

The structured questionnaire combined electoral-opinion questions with respondent characteristics. The electoral module covered intended participation, reasons for possible non-participation, issue priorities, possible candidacies, direct voting support, coalition viability, coalition leadership, current vote intention and perceived winning chance. The background module recorded gender, age, education, employment, first-time-voter status and LGA, allowing the national findings to be examined across major population groups.

2.2 Data Collection and Quality Assurance

Survey data were collected through computer-assisted personal interviewing using a programmed electronic questionnaire. The instrument contained enumerator and supervisor identifiers, GPS fields and interview timing information to support field supervision and data-quality control. Participation of interviewees were voluntary and based on informed consent.

Field data collection was conducted in-person in all the 53 electoral constituencies, with one enumerator assigned to each constituency. Field data collection was conducted between July 27th, 2026, through August 10th, 2026. Each enumerator was trained on the data collection and survey methodology and as well engaged in a simulation exercise. The simulation exercise allowed Gambia Participates to test the survey systems, tools, and human errors and correct them before deployment the enumerators.

The analytical process included a systematic review of question labels, response categories, counts, percentages and subgroup totals. National distributions were reconciled with their underlying response counts. Cross-tabulations were checked to confirm that every gender, age-group and LGA distribution represented the responses within that subgroup. Grand-total rows were excluded from subgroup charts, and all reported values were rounded-up consistently.

2.3 Data Processing and Analysis

Data were cleaned, coded, tabulated and analysed using Stata version 17. The analysis proceeded in four stages. First, national response distributions were calculated for every electoral indicator, including intended participation, reasons for possible non-participation and issue priorities.

Second, matched R1 and R2 questions were aligned, and changes were expressed in percentage points. Third, R2 results were disaggregated by gender, age group and LGA where the supplied analytical tables supported the comparison. Fourth, the national, comparative and subgroup findings were reviewed together to identify the main electoral patterns. Charts and tables use the response labels and percentage values in the verified analytical tables. Because percentages are rounded, displayed categories may not always total exactly 100%.

2.4 Round Comparison

R1 refers to the August 2025 poll documented in the earlier report and R2 refers to the August 2026 (current) round. Both rounds contain 1,556 respondents. Changes in performance are presented in percentage points. Because these are separate cross-sectional samples, differences describe shifts in aggregate opinion and not changes made by the same individuals.

2.5 Verification of Round-Specific Results

The best-chance indicator was verified directly from the round-specific response counts. In R2, the 1,556 responses comprise 792 for Adama Barrow, 356 for Ousainou Darboe, 187 for Talib Bensouda, 173 undecided, 21 for Essa Mbaye Faal, 15 for Mama Kandeh and 12 for Others. The corresponding R1 count for Barrow is 481 of 1,556. These counts produce the reported round-specific values of 51% in R2 and 31% in R1 for the incumbent.

2.6 Interpretation of the Results

The findings represent public opinion at the time of each survey round. Subgroup percentages are calculated within each gender, age group or LGA. Differences across these groups describe the distribution of views in the achieved sample and are most informative when they are clear and consistent. Smaller percentage differences and results from groups with fewer respondents are read with appropriate care. R1 and R2 are separate cross-sectional surveys, so changes between rounds describe movement in aggregate opinion rather than the decisions of the same individuals.

3. Socio-Demographic Profile

The R2 sample is 59% male and 41% female. Respondents aged 25–34 forms the largest age group at 30%, followed by those aged 35–44 at 27%. Young people aged 18-24 only covers 16% of the total respondents. Secondary education is the largest education category (32%), and 24% of respondents identify as **first-time voters**. The sample covers every LGA, with Brikama (West Coast Region) contributing the largest share (24% of respondents), followed by Kanifing at 17% and Basse at 14%.

Demographic	Count	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Female	1556.00	0.41	0.49	0.00	1.00
Male	1556.00	0.59	0.49	0.00	1.00
Education	Count	Mean	SD	Min	Max
None	1556.00	0.28	0.45	0.00	1.00
Primary	1556.00	0.15	0.36	0.00	1.00
Secondary	1556.00	0.32	0.47	0.00	1.00
Tertiary	1556.00	0.25	0.43	0.00	1.00
First Time Voter	Count	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Yes	1556.00	0.24	0.42	0.00	1.00
No	1556.00	0.76	0.42	0.00	1.00

Residence	Count	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Urban	1556.00	0.34	0.47	0.00	1.00
Rural	1556.00	0.66	0.47	0.00	1.00
Age Group	Count	Mean	SD	Min	Max
18–24	1556.00	0.16	0.37	0.00	1.00
25–34	1556.00	0.30	0.46	0.00	1.00
35–44	1556.00	0.27	0.45	0.00	1.00
45–54	1556.00	0.14	0.35	0.00	1.00
55+	1556.00	0.12	0.33	0.00	1.00
Sector	Count	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Public	1556.00	0.19	0.39	0.00	1.00
Private	1556.00	0.17	0.38	0.00	1.00
NGO	1556.00	0.02	0.15	0.00	1.00
Informal	1556.00	0.23	0.42	0.00	1.00
Unemployed	1556.00	0.39	0.49	0.00	1.00
Local Government Area	Count	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Banjul	1556.00	0.04	0.20	0.00	1.00
Kanifing	1556.00	0.17	0.37	0.00	1.00
Brikama	1556.00	0.24	0.43	0.00	1.00
Kerewan	1556.00	0.13	0.34	0.00	1.00
Mansakonko	1556.00	0.09	0.28	0.00	1.00
Kuntaur	1556.00	0.08	0.28	0.00	1.00
Janjanbureh	1556.00	0.11	0.32	0.00	1.00
Basse	1556.00	0.14	0.35	0.00	1.00




Figure 1. Respondents by gender




Figure 2. Respondents by age group




Figure 3. Respondents by education level




Figure 4. Respondents by employment sector




Figure 5. Respondents by LGA




Figure 6. First-time voter status

3.1 How the Results Should Be Read

National percentages describe the full achieved sample, while subgroup charts report percentages within each gender, age group or LGA. For example, the female result shows the share of female respondents selecting each answer. This approach allows groups of different sizes to be compared on the same basis and keeps the interpretation focused on the distribution of opinion within each group.

4. Voter Participation and Issue-Based Voting

The survey includes indicators on willingness to participate in the 2026 Presidential Election, reasons for intending not to vote and the issues respondents expect to shape their electoral choices. Together, these measures show both the strength of intended participation and the policy concerns likely to influence voter judgement.

4.1 Intended Participation in the 2026 Presidential Election

At national level, 92% say they intend to vote, 3% say they do not and 5% are undecided or not sure. The combined No and Undecided/Not Sure categories comprise 111 respondents, or 7% of the sample. Intended participation and expected voter turnout is therefore high, while a smaller group remains either disengaged or not yet firmly committed to voting.




Figure 7. Would you vote in the 2026 Presidential Election? — national R2 results

Gender Analysis

Intended participation is almost identical among women and men: 93% of female respondents and 93% of male respondents say they will vote. Men record a slightly larger Undecided/Not Sure share (5%) than women (4%), while the No category remains at 3% or below for both groups. The high participation intention therefore extends across gender.




Figure 8. Intention to vote in the 2026 Presidential Election by gender

Age-Group Analysis

Yes exceeds 90% in every age group. It rises from 91% among respondents aged 18–24 to 95% among those aged 45–54, before remaining high at 95% among respondents aged 55 and above. The Undecided/Not Sure share is highest among ages 25–34 at 6% and lowest among ages 55 and above at 2%. Mobilisation efforts may therefore focus particularly on younger adults who have not yet made a firm participation decision.




Figure 9. Intention to vote in the 2026 Presidential Election by age group

4.2 Reasons for Not Intending to Vote

Among the 40 respondents who say they do not intend to vote, 73% cite lack of confidence in the current candidates, 13% cite lack of confidence in the electoral process and 15% gave other reasons. The Other category includes the 3% who reported that they did not see their voters cards. Candidate confidence is therefore the main stated source of potential voter apathy within this small subgroup.





Figure 10. Reasons for not intending to vote in the 2026 Presidential Election

Demographic Analysis

Lack of confidence in the current candidates is the leading reason among both women (78%) and men (68%) who say they will not vote. Men more often cite lack of confidence in the electoral process (18%) than women (6%). After combining “Not registered to vote” with Other, the Other category represents 16% among women and 14% among men.



4.3 Issues Expected to Influence Voting Decisions

The economy and cost of living is the most widely selected issue, identified by 76% of respondents. It is followed by security and national stability (55%), healthcare (50%), electricity and water supply (35%), other issues (29%) and employment (25%). Infrastructure development and corruption are each selected by 18%. Because respondents could choose more than one issue, these percentages measure the prevalence of each concern and do not sum to 100%.




Figure 11. Issues expected to influence voting decisions — national R2 results

5. President Barrow: Third Term and Voting Prospects

The question of whether President Adama Barrow should seek another term is central to the emerging electoral debate. The poll separates public acceptance of his participation from willingness to vote for him, because these are related but distinct judgements.

5.1 Public Sentiment on President Barrow's Potential Third-Term Bid

This item measures acceptance of a possible candidacy, not an intention to vote for the incumbent. A respondent may consider a third-term bid legitimate or desirable while still preferring another candidate.

At national level, Yes accounts for 46%, followed by No at 46%. The remaining Not Sure response is 8%. The results show an evenly split outcome, with both 'Yes' and 'No' accounting for 46% of responses, while 8% of respondents remain unsure.

The near-even division is politically important. The result does not amount to majority endorsement of a third-term bid: the 'Yes' share remains below half, while the combined 'No' and 'Not Sure' shares form a majority. At the same time, the movement since R1 shows that public acceptance of Barrow entering the race has grown. This may improve the political environment for an incumbent candidacy, but it should not be confused with a commitment to re-elect him.




Figure 12. Do you believe President Adama Barrow should contest for a third term in the 2026 Presidential Election? — national R2 results

Round 1–Round 2 Comparison

Between R1 and R2, the largest increase is recorded for Yes, rising by 11 percentage points. The largest decline is recorded for No, falling by 9 percentage points.




Figure 13. R1–R2 comparison

Gender Analysis

Women are more supportive of a Barrow third-term bid: 52% say Yes, compared with 38% who say No. Among men, the balance is reversed, with 42% saying Yes and 51% saying No. The 9.7-point gender difference in Yes responses shows that the national near-tie is produced by contrasting gender distributions rather than identical views among women and men.




Figure 14. Public Sentiment on President Barrow's Potential Third-Term Bid by Gender

Age-Group Analysis

Support for Barrow contesting is below opposition among respondents aged 18–24 and 25–34, but Yes becomes the leading response from age 35 onwards. Yes reaches 51% among respondents aged 55 and above, compared with 44% among ages 18–24 and 44% among ages 25–34. The age profile therefore becomes more favourable to a third-term candidacy among the older groups.




Figure 15. Public Sentiment on President Barrow's Potential Third-Term Bid by Age-Group

Regional Analysis

Regional opinion is sharply differentiated. Yes reaches 71% in Basse and 55% in Kuntaur, while it falls to 25% in Mansakonko and 40% in Kerewan. In Banjul and Brikama, Yes and No are closely balanced, whereas Kanifing records a clearer No majority. The national near-even result therefore combines strong endorsement in parts of the eastern region with substantially greater resistance elsewhere.




Figure 16. Public Sentiment on President Barrow's Potential Third-Term Bid by Regional

5.2 Electoral Support for President Barrow's Possible 2026 Candidacy

This is a direct vote-propensity measure for Barrow. It provides a firmer electoral test than the candidacy-acceptance question, while the undecided category indicates the remaining contestable electorate.

At national level, No accounts for 54%, followed by Yes at 31%. The remaining Undecided response is 16%. The result shows that the leading position is clear, with a 23-point gap between the two largest categories.

Barrow's direct electoral support has improved, but the national picture remains challenging. A majority do not currently say they would vote for him: 54% answer No and 16% are undecided. His improvement from R1 therefore represents meaningful momentum from a relatively low starting point rather than evidence of majority vote support.




Figure 17. If President Barrow runs in the 2026 election, would you vote for him? — national R2 results

Round 1–Round 2 Comparison

Between R1 and R2, the largest increase is recorded for Yes, rising by 11 percentage points. The largest decline is recorded for No, falling by 6 percentage points.




Figure 18. R1–R2 comparison

Gender Analysis

Women are more willing than men to vote for Barrow: 35% of women say Yes, compared with 28% of men. The No response is correspondingly lower among women (50%) than men (56%), while undecided shares are similar at about 15%–16%. The gender difference concerns declared support more than uncertainty.




Figure 19. Electoral Support for President Barrow's Possible 2026 Candidacy by Gender

Age-Group Analysis

Direct support for Barrow increases with age, from 25% among ages 18–24 and 25% among ages 25–34 to 37% among ages 45–54 and 38% among ages 55 and above. No remains the leading response in every age group, but its margin narrows markedly among older respondents. The undecided share is highest among ages 45–54 at 19%.




Figure 20. Electoral Support for President Barrow's Possible 2026 Candidacy by Age-Group

Regional Analysis

Basse is Barrow's strongest direct-support area at 55%, followed by Kuntaur at 42% and Banjul at 35%. Support is lowest in Mansakonko at 20% and Kanifing at 20%. Brikama combines low Yes support (21%) with the largest regional undecided share (21%), making voter conversion particularly important in the country's largest LGA sample.




Figure 21. Electoral Support for President Barrow's Possible 2026 Candidacy by Regional

6. Ousainou Darboe: Candidacy and Voting Prospects

Ousainou Darboe remains a major opposition figure in Gambian politics. Two measures are used to assess his position: whether he should contest in the 2026 election and whether respondents would personally vote for him if he entered the race.

6.1 Public Opinion on Ousainou Darboe's Potential 2026 Presidential Bid

This item captures whether Darboe should enter the race and it should be distinguished from the later question asking whether the respondent would personally vote for him.

At national level, Yes accounts for 46%, followed by No at 45%. The remaining Not Sure response is 9%. The result shows that the leading position is narrow, with a 1-point gap between the two largest categories.

Darboe's position has strengthened substantially as a potential candidate. The sharp rise in Yes responses and decline in opposition demonstrate increased acceptance of his participation in the 2026 contest. Nevertheless, the result remains almost evenly divided, meaning that his candidacy continues to generate both significant support and significant resistance.




Figure 22. Do you believe Ousainou Darboe should contest in the 2026 Presidential Election? — national R2 results

Round 1–Round 2 Comparison

Between R1 and R2, the largest increase is recorded for Yes, rising by 17 percentage points. The largest decline is recorded for No, falling by 13 percentage points.




Figure 23. R1–R2 comparison

Gender Analysis

Men are more supportive of Darboe contesting than women: 48% of men say Yes, compared with 42% of women. Among women, No leads at 47%; among men, Yes leads at 48%. The gender pattern is therefore the reverse of Barrow's candidacy result, where women are the more supportive group.




Figure 24. Public Opinion on Ousainou Darboe's Potential 2026 Presidential Bid by Gender

Age-Group Analysis

Support for Darboe contesting rises from 36% among ages 18–24 to 50% among ages 45–54 and 50% among those aged 55 and above. No is strongest among the youngest group at 54%, while the contest becomes more favourable from age 35 onwards. Darboe's candidacy acceptance therefore has a distinctly older age profile.




Figure 25. Public Opinion on Ousainou Darboe's Potential 2026 Presidential Bid by Age-Group

Regional Analysis

Darboe's candidacy receives its strongest acceptance in Mansakonko (62%), Basse (53%) and Kuntaur (53%). It is weakest in Banjul, where 19% say Yes and 73% say No. Brikama and Kanifing also record No majorities, while Kerewan is closely balanced but slightly favourable. These results locate Darboe's strongest candidacy acceptance outside the principal urban LGAs.




Figure 26. Public Opinion on Ousainou Darboe's Potential 2026 Presidential Bid by Regional

6.2 Voter Support for Ousainou Darboe in the 2026 Presidential Election

This measure tests Darboe’s personal vote conversion. Comparing it with support for his candidacy reveals whether acceptance of his participation translates into intended electoral support.

At national level, No accounts for 62%, followed by Yes at 26%. The remaining Undecided response is 12%. The result shows that the leading position is clear, with a 36-point gap between the two largest categories.

Darboe converts only part of his candidacy acceptance into declared voting support. While 46% believe he should contest, 26% say they would vote for him. The gap indicates that some respondents welcome his participation without selecting him as their current electoral choice. His increased direct support nevertheless places him firmly among the leading opposition contenders.




Figure 27. If Ousainou Darboe runs in the 2026 election, would you vote for him? — national R2 results

Round 1–Round 2 Comparison

Between R1 and R2, voter support for Darboe increased by 7 percentage points and the largest decline is recorded for Undecided, falling by 6 percentage points. This could suggest that a good percentage of the undecided group have shifted towards the Yes category, thus increasing the voter support for Darboe, compared to R1.




Figure 28. R1–R2 comparison

Gender Analysis

Men show higher direct support for Darboe than women: 28% compared with 23%. No remains the majority response among both groups, at 60% for men and 65% for women, while undecided shares are almost identical at about 12%. The gender gap is therefore concentrated in the Yes and No categories rather than uncertainty.




Figure 29. Voter Support for Ousainou Darboe in the 2026 Presidential Election by Gender

Age-Group Analysis

Direct support for Darboe rises from 22% among ages 18–24 to 31% among ages 45–54. No remains the majority response in every age group but declines from 70% among the youngest respondents to 55% among ages 45–54. The age pattern reinforces the wider finding that Darboe’s support is comparatively stronger among older voters.




Figure 30. Voter Support for Ousainou Darboe in the 2026 Presidential Election by Age-Group

Regional Analysis

Darboe records his strongest direct support in Mansakonko at 48% and Kerewan at 41%. Support falls to 8% in Banjul and remains near one-fifth in Basse, Brikama, Kanifing and Kuntaur. His regional profile is therefore concentrated in selected LGAs rather than evenly distributed nationally.




Figure 31. Voter Support for Ousainou Darboe in the 2026 Presidential Election by Regional

7. Coalition Politics and Leadership

Coalition politics is likely to remain prominent as political parties and aspiring presidential candidates prepare ahead of the candidate nomination in October 2026 and official campaign in November 2026. The survey tests two hypothetical coalition configurations and, for one arrangement, asks who should lead it.

7.1 Electoral Viability of a Talib Bensouda, Essa Mbaye Faal, and Mama Kandeh led Coalition

This question concerns perceived coalition viability rather than respondents' personal vote. The sizeable "Not Sure" category is therefore important evidence of uncertainty about coalition composition, leadership and mobilization capacity.

At national level, Yes accounts for 36%, followed by No at 33%. The remaining Not Sure response is 31%. The result shows that the perception that this coalition could win the 2026 Presidential election, though records a positive position at 36%, it is narrowly above the No category by just 3-point gap.

The said coalition is no longer viewed as clearly viable by most respondents, compared to R1. This shift in voter position/perception could largely be attributed to the public banter amongst coalition members and internal disagreements on who should lead the coalition. Yes and No are close, while almost one-third of the respondents remain unsure. This level of uncertainty is consistent with an alliance whose programme, leadership arrangements, campaign structure and vote-transfer capacity have not yet been tested publicly. The result is best read as conditional public confidence rather than a definitive rejection of cooperation among the named figures.




Figure 32. Could a coalition involving Talib Bensouda, Essa Mbaye Faal and Mama Kandeh win the 2026 Presidential Election? — national R2 results

Round 1–Round 2 Comparison

Between R1 and R2, the largest increase is recorded for No, rising by 17 percentage points. The largest decline is recorded for Yes, falling by 18 percentage points. A major shift in voter position that could largely be influenced by the coalition building process and the public disagreements amongst its members.




Figure 33. R1–R2 comparison

Gender Analysis

Gender differences on the named three-person coalition are limited. Yes stands at 37% among men and 36% among women. Women divide evenly between Yes and Not Sure (both 36%), while men divide almost evenly between Yes (37%) and No (36%). The result shows uncertainty among women and a more polarised judgement among men.




Figure 34. Electoral Viability of a Talib Bensouda–Essa Mbaye Faal–Mama Kandeh Coalition by Gender

Age-Group Analysis

Age is a major dividing line in confidence in the named coalition. Yes reaches 51% among respondents aged 18–24 and 40% among ages 25–34, but falls to 31% among ages 35–44, 32% among ages 45–54 and 24% among those aged 55 and above. Confidence therefore declines steadily as age increases, while No becomes the leading response in the three oldest groups.




Figure 35. Electoral Viability of a Talib Bensouda–Essa Mbaye Faal–Mama Kandeh Coalition by Age-Group

Regional Analysis

Confidence in the named coalition is highest in Kuntaur (46%) and Kanifing (45%), and lowest in Mansakonko (22%). Basse records the strongest No response at 46%, while Kerewan has the largest Not Sure share at 40%. The regional results distinguish areas of relative optimism from areas where opposition or uncertainty is more prominent.




Figure 36. Electoral Viability of a Talib Bensouda–Essa Mbaye Faal–Mama Kandeh Coalition by Regional

7.3 Preferred Leadership for a Prospective Political Coalition

Leadership preference is assessed among the named potential coalition members, following the same indicators from R1. A large percentage of “Don’t Know” group share signals that the coalition idea remains unsettled even where one potential leader ranks first.

The national results place Talib Bensouda first at 40%, followed by Don’t know at 30% and Mama Kandeh at 17%. The distribution indicates a preference for a Talib led coalition when compared to the two other candidates.

Talib Bensouda has the clearest leadership advantage among the named options, but the 30% Don’t know makes the field still-fluid. The electorate has therefore not reached a settled view about coalition leadership. Bensouda’s advantage establishes him as the most visible preference within this hypothetical arrangement, while leaving considerable space for negotiation and persuasion.




Figure 37. If such a coalition is formed, who should lead it? — national R2 results

Round 1–Round 2 Comparison

Between R1 and R2, the largest increase is recorded for Talib Bensouda, rising by 2 percentage points. The largest decline is recorded for Don’t know, falling by 2 percentage points.




Figure 38. R1–R2 comparison

Gender Analysis

Bensouda leads the coalition-leadership choices among both women and men, with 42% support among women and 39% among men. Women also record a higher Don't know share (33%) than men (28%), while men show more support for Essa Mbaye Faal and Mama Kandeh. Bensouda's lead is therefore cross-gender, although secondary preferences differ.




Figure 39. Preferred Leadership for a Prospective Political Coalition by Gender

Age-Group Analysis

Bensouda's leadership preference is strongest among younger respondents: 53% among ages 18–24 and 46% among ages 25–34. His share declines to 39% among ages 35–44, 32% among ages 45–54 and 22% among those aged 55 and above. Among the two oldest groups, Don't know becomes the largest category, showing that his leadership advantage is primarily youth driven.




Figure 40. Preferred Leadership for a Prospective Political Coalition by Age-Group

Regional Analysis

Bensouda is the leading coalition-leadership preference in seven LGAs, reaching 48% in Banjul, 45% in Kanifing and 43% in Brikama. In Basse, Mama Kandeh leads at 39% compared with Bensouda's 32%. Don't know is particularly high in Kuntaur and Kanifing, indicating that Bensouda's broad geographic lead coexists with substantial uncertainty in some areas.




Figure 41. Preferred Leadership for a Prospective Political Coalition by Regional

7.4 Prospects of a UDP-Led Coalition

This item measures confidence in the competitiveness of a UDP-led coalition. It does not establish the eventual membership, flagbearer or vote share of such a coalition.

At national level, Yes accounts for 47%, followed by No at 33%. The remaining Not Sure response is 20%. The result shows that the leading position is clear, with a 13-point gap between the two largest categories.

The prospects of a UDP-led coalition winning the 2026 Presidential election receives a relative plurality of positive responses, but the support falls below 50%. The result indicates that a UDP institutional anchor may be seen as more competitive than the specifically named three-person arrangement. However, the 20% Not Sure share and the absence of information on coalition members and its agenda, mean that confidence remains provisional.




Figure 42. Do you think a UDP-led coalition could win the 2026 Presidential Election? — national R2 results

Gender Analysis

Across the gender categories, Yes records the leading response in 2 of 2 groups. For Yes, the share ranges from 44% in Female to 49% in Male, a difference of 5 percentage points.




Figure 43. Prospects of a UDP-Led Coalition by Gender

Age-Group Analysis

Support for a UDP-led coalition is comparatively stable across age groups, ranging from 44% among respondents aged 55 and above to 49% among ages 45–54. Yes is the leading response in every age category. The most notable age difference is uncertainty, which reaches 25% among the oldest respondents but remains below 21% in the other groups.




Figure 44. Prospects of a UDP-Led Coalition by Age-Group

Regional Analysis

Regional confidence in a UDP-led coalition is highest in Mansakonko at 63%, followed by Janjanbureh at 59% and Kerewan at 54%. It is lowest in Basse at 38%, where No reaches 44%. Brikama is evenly divided between Yes and No at 39%, while Kanifing and Kuntaur record Yes pluralities.




Figure 45. Prospects of a UDP-Led Coalition by Regional

8. Voting Intention and Perceived Frontrunners

The final group of indicators moves from hypothetical candidacies and coalitions to the electorate's present choice and its judgement about who is most likely to win. These measures provide the clearest snapshot of the competitive landscape, but they must be interpreted as current voter intention rather than an election verdict.

8.1 Voting Intention if the Election Were Held Today

This is the report's closest measure of current voting intention. It though remains a snapshot of the current political environment: candidate nominations, coalition building, campaigning and late movement among undecided voters can change the final distribution on or before December 5th, 2026.

The national results place Adama Barrow first at 32%, followed by Ousainou Darboe at 25% and Talib Bensouda at 19%. The distribution indicates a competitive and still-fluid field, particularly where the undecided share remains substantial.

The vote-intention distribution points to a genuinely competitive race rather than a settled outcome. Barrow leads, but his 32% is well below a majority. Darboe and Bensouda together account for 44%, although those shares cannot automatically be combined because the poll did not test vote transfer under a single opposition ticket. The 17% undecided bloc is large enough to influence the eventual balance, while campaign developments could also change declared preferences. One thing that is certain is that any of the top 3 candidates could win the 2026 presidential election if they are successful in canvassing the undecided voters.




Figure 46. If elections were held today, who would you vote for? — national R2 results

Gender Analysis

Barrow leads current vote intention among both women and men, but his share is higher among women (35%) than men (29%). Darboe is stronger among men (27%) than women (22%), while Bensouda is almost identical across gender at 20% among women and 19% among men. Undecided shares are also close, at 17% among women and 17% among men.




Figure 47. Voting Intention if the Election Were Held Today by Gender

Age-Group Analysis

The age profile separates the three leading candidates. Bensouda leads among ages 18–24 at 33%, ahead of Barrow at 25% and Darboe at 19%. Barrow moves into first place from age 25 onwards and reaches 41% among ages 45–54. Darboe's share also rises with age, reaching 30% among respondents aged 55 and above. Undecided voters are most prominent among ages 25–34 at 20%.




Figure 48. Voting Intention if the Election Were Held Today by Age-Group

Regional Analysis

The regional contest has no uniform ordering. Barrow leads in Basse (57%), Kuntaur (39%), Banjul (36%) and Janjanbureh (31%). Darboe leads in Mansakonko (48%) and Kerewan (39%), while Bensouda leads in Kanifing (27%) and narrowly in Brikama (24%). Undecided voters are largest in Janjanbureh (25%), Brikama (24%) and Kanifing (22%), making these LGAs especially open to movement.




Figure 49. Voting Intention if the Election Were Held Today by Regional

8.2 Perceived Frontrunners for the 2026 Presidential Election

This question measures perceived electability, not personal preference. Respondents can believe that a candidate is most likely to win while intending to vote for somebody else. It must therefore be read alongside, not substituted for, the vote-intention result.

The national results place Adama Barrow first at 51%, followed by Ousainou Darboe at 23% and Talib Bensouda at 12%. The distribution indicates a competitive and still-fluid field, particularly where the undecided share remains substantial.

The finding gives Barrow a strong expectation advantage: one respondent in two sees him as the most likely winner. This is not the same as predicting a 51% vote share. It indicates perceived strength, which may reflect incumbency, national visibility, access to an established political organisation, expectations about opposition fragmentation, or other considerations not directly tested in the questionnaire. Darboe is a distant second on perceived electability, while Bensouda's perceived chance is below his stated vote-intention share.




Figure 50. Who currently stands the best chance of winning the 2026 Presidential Election? — national R2 results

Round 1–Round 2 Comparison

Between R1 and R2, the largest increase is recorded for Adama Barrow, rising by 20 percentage points. The largest decline is recorded for Undecided, falling by 18 percentage points.




Figure 51. R1–R2 comparison

Gender Analysis

Perceptions of Barrow's winning chance are almost identical by gender: 50% among women and 51% among men. Darboe's perceived chance is higher among men (25%) than women (20%), while Bensouda's is higher among women (13%) than men (11%). The incumbent's expectation advantage therefore cuts across gender even as views of the closest alternatives differ.




Figure 52. Perceived Frontrunners for the 2026 Presidential Election by Gender

Age-Group Analysis

Barrow is identified as the most likely winner by approximately half of every age group, ranging only from 50% among ages 25–34 and respondents aged 55 and above to 53% among ages 35–44. Darboe’s perceived chance rises with age, from 18% among ages 18–24 to 29% among those aged 55 and above, while Bensouda’s falls from 18% to 4%. The alternative-candidate pattern therefore changes sharply by generation even though Barrow’s rating remains stable.




Figure 53. Perceived Frontrunners for the 2026 Presidential Election by Age-Group

Regional Analysis

Barrow leads perceived electability in seven LGAs, reaching 67% in Basse, 60% in Banjul and 59% in Janjanbureh. Mansakonko is the exception, where Darboe leads at 46% compared with

Barrow's 36%. Barrow's expectation advantage is also narrower in Kerewan, where 42% select him and 36% select Darboe.




Figure 54. Perceived Frontrunners for the 2026 Presidential Election by Regional

8.3 Voting Intention versus Perceived Electability

The two questions produce different results because they measure different judgements. Adama Barrow: 32% vote intention versus 51% perceived best chance (+19 points); Ousainou Darboe: 25% vote intention versus 23% perceived best chance (-2 points); Talib Bensouda: 19% vote intention versus 12% perceived best chance (-7 points). Barrow's positive gap is particularly large: more respondents expect him to be the strongest contender than say they would currently vote for him. For Bensouda, current voting support is higher than the share identifying him as the most likely winner.

Candidate	Would vote now	Best chance	Electability gap
Adama Barrow	32%	51%	+19 pp
Ousainou Darboe	25%	23%	-2 pp
Talib Bensouda	19%	12%	-7 pp

The result helps explain why 51% for Barrow is plausible even though only 32% say they would vote for him if the election were held today. The first figure is a forecast-like judgement about who appears strongest; the second is a statement of current personal choice. The 19-point gap indicates recognition of electoral advantage beyond Barrow's own stated vote base, potentially reflecting incumbency, visibility, organization or expectations about opposition fragmentation. These mechanisms are contextual interpretations and were not directly measured by the questionnaire.

9. Cross-Round Comparative Synthesis

Indicator	Largest-moving response	R1	R2	Change
Public Sentiment on President Barrow's Potential Third-Term Bid	Yes	35%	46%	+11 pp
Public Opinion on Ousainou Darboe's Potential 2026 Presidential Bid	Yes	28%	46%	+18 pp
Electoral Support for President Barrow's Possible 2026 Candidacy	Yes	19%	31%	+12 pp
Voter Support for Ousainou Darboe in the 2026 Presidential Election	Yes	18%	26%	+8 pp
Electoral Viability of a Talib Bensouda, Essa Mbaye Faal and Mama Kandeh Coalition	Yes	55%	36%	-19 pp
Preferred Leadership for a Prospective Political Coalition	Talib Bensouda	38%	40%	+2 pp
Perceived Frontrunners for the 2026 Presidential Election	Adama Barrow	31%	51%	+20 pp

The comparisons show that opinion is not moving uniformly. Acceptance of both Barrow and Darboe contesting increased, and direct voting support for each also rose. In contrast, confidence in the specified three-person coalition declined sharply. Leadership preferences within that coalition changed only modestly, with Talib Bensouda strengthening his lead. Candidate-level support and coalition-level confidence therefore represent distinct dimensions of voter opinion.

9.1 Candidate Acceptance Has Risen Faster than Vote Conversion

Support for Barrow seeking a third term increased from 35% in August 2025 to 46% in August 2026, while stated willingness to vote for him rose from 19% to 31%. Darboe shows a similar but more pronounced candidacy shift: support for him contesting rose from 28% to 46%, while willingness to vote for him increased from 18% to 26%. For both figures, acceptance of participation remains higher than direct electoral support. A section of the electorate therefore accepts the two candidates' participation without selecting that candidate as its current voting choice.

9.2 Coalition Confidence Has Become More Conditional

Belief that the named Bensouda-Faal-Kandeh coalition could win declined by 18 points, from 55% to 36%, even though Bensouda remained the preferred leader of that arrangement. By contrast, 47% believe a UDP-led coalition could win the 2026 election in this round. Respondents clearly evaluate coalition configurations differently. The result applies to the arrangements tested in the questionnaire and does not represent a general measure of support for every possible coalition.

9.3 The Electorate Remains Competitive and Geographically Uneven

No candidate commands an absolute majority in the direct vote intention question. Barrow leads at 32%, Darboe follows at 25%, Bensouda records 19%, and 17% remain undecided. The LGA charts show different local ordering: Barrow is strongest in Basse, while Darboe leads in Kerewan and

Mansakonko (a stronghold for Darboe), Bensouda leads in Kanifing while narrowly leading in Brikama, a battleground for the 2026 elections. The results show that Kanifing, Janjanbureh and Brikama will be a battle ground between the top 3 candidates.

10. Election Outlook, Implications and Conclusion

Taken together, the results describe an election environment with high intended participation, a clear frontrunner advantage in perceived electability and no settled majority in current vote intention. Ninety-three per cent say they intend to vote, while 7% either say they will not vote or remain undecided about participation. Barrow leads vote intention at 32%, but the direction of the contest will also depend on how undecided voters respond to candidates, coalitions and the leading public concerns: the economy and cost of living, security and national stability, and healthcare.

The poll places Barrow, Darboe and Bensouda as the three leading current choices. Barrow holds a 7-point lead over Darboe and a strong expectation advantage, while the opposition vote is distributed across more than one candidate. The findings do not test a final three-candidate ballot or the transfer of votes under a coalition; they therefore support an assessment of a competitive field rather than a prediction of the final result.

10.1 Principal Findings

- The incumbent retains the strongest national position in both immediate voting intention and perceived electability, but a majority still either would not vote for him or remains undecided in the direct-vote question.
- Darboe's acceptability as a candidate increased markedly between rounds, yet the gap between supporting his candidacy and intending to vote for him remains substantial.
- Bensouda has a pronounced generational profile: his support and perceived competitiveness are strongest among younger voters and decline steadily with age.
- Regional patterns remain highly differentiated. No candidate or coalition configuration has uniform strength across all LGAs, underlining the importance of geographically targeted engagement.
- Women are more supportive than men of Barrow contesting and voting for him, while male respondents are more supportive of Darboe. Gender differences are smaller on the UDP-led coalition question.
- The undecided and not-sure categories remain politically consequential, particularly in vote intention and coalition viability. Poll findings record current opinion rather than the final election result.

10.2 What the Findings Mean for the Electoral Contest

For Barrow, the central advantage is perceived viability. He leads national vote intention and is regarded as the most likely winner by half of respondents. His challenge is conversion, the gap between 51% perceived electability and 32% vote intention shows that recognition of strength does not automatically translate into a declared vote. The third-term question is also closely divided, so the legitimacy and desirability of another candidacy remain contested among the public.

For Darboe, the strongest positive development is the increase in acceptance of his candidacy and his improved direct support between rounds. His challenge is to narrow the difference between those who believe he should contest and those who currently intend to vote for him. His relatively

strong results in selected LGAs indicate a meaningful geographic base, but national competitiveness requires wider conversion across regions and demographic groups.

For Bensouda, the poll records a notable vote-intention base and a strong position as preferred leader of the named coalition, especially among younger segments. His perceived winning chance is lower than his current vote-intention share, showing a gap between personal support and the level of public expectation that he will win nationally.

For prospective coalitions, the evidence is conditional rather than uniformly favourable or unfavourable. Respondents distinguish between coalition configurations. A UDP-led coalition attracts more confidence than the specifically named Bensouda-Faal-Kandeh arrangement, but neither result should be treated as a direct estimate of support for an actual alliance that has not been finalised.

10.3 Overall Assessment

The R2 poll depicts a contest in which the incumbent is widely perceived as the candidate most likely to win but does not hold majority voting intention. The opposition vote is distributed principally between Darboe and Bensouda, while coalition judgements remain conditional and a meaningful undecided segment persists. The strongest interpretation is therefore **not that the outcome is settled**, but that Barrow holds an expectation advantage within a fragmented and regionally differentiated field.

For public communication, the 51% best-chance result is presented together with the 32% vote-intention result and the relevant denominator. This preserves the distinction between perceived electability and personal choice.

10.4 Conclusion

The R2 opinion poll provides evidence of a competitive presidential race in which Barrow begins with the strongest national position but not an assured majority. Darboe remains a significant challenger, Bensouda has emerged as an important new force in the race, and coalition calculations continue to shape public expectations. The electorate is neither completely polarised nor fully decided; substantial sections distinguish between approving a candidacy, intending to vote for a candidate and perceived chances of such candidate winning the election.

The most responsible conclusion is therefore that the election remains open to political developments. Barrow's expectation advantage is real within the survey, but vote intention is more fragmented. Opposition prospects depend on candidate conversion, alliance credibility, geographic expansion and the behaviour of undecided voters. Continued polling using consistent questions and clearly separated round-specific datasets will be valuable for tracking how these dynamics evolve before the election day scheduled for December 5th 2026.

11. Guidance for Public & Media Dissemination

To preserve accuracy and public confidence, public dissemination materials should use the exact wording of the question being reported. Headlines, media interviews, infographics and social-media posts should **distinguish** clearly between current voting intention, support for a candidate contesting, belief that a coalition could win and perceived best chance of victory. In the absence of distinction, the questions and its corresponding figures will be conflated with others leading to inaccurate media reporting or public analysis of the survey data.

Appendix: Comparative Indicator Values

Public Sentiment on President Barrow's Potential Third-Term Bid

Response	R1	R2	Change
No	55%	46%	-9 pp
Not Sure	10%	8%	-2 pp
Yes	35%	46%	+11 pp

Public Opinion on Ousainou Darboe's Potential 2026 Presidential Bid

Response	R1	R2	Change
No	58%	45%	-13 pp
Not Sure	13%	10%	-3 pp
Yes	28%	46%	+18 pp

Electoral Support for President Barrow's Possible 2026 Candidacy

Response	R1	R2	Change
No	60%	54%	-6 pp
Undecided	20%	16%	-4 pp
Yes	19%	31%	+12 pp

Voter Support for Ousainou Darboe in the 2026 Presidential Election

Response	R1	R2	Change
No	63%	62%	-1 pp
Undecided	18%	12%	-6 pp
Yes	18%	26%	+8 pp

Electoral Viability of a Talib Bensouda–Essa Mbaye Faal–Mama Kandeh Coalition

Response	R1	R2	Change
No	16%	33%	+17 pp
Not Sure	29%	31%	+2 pp
Yes	55%	36%	-19 pp

Preferred Leadership for a Prospective Political Coalition

Response	R1	R2	Change
Don't know	33%	30%	-2.7 pp
Essa Mbaye Faal	12%	12%	0 pp
Mama Kandeh	14%	17%	+3 pp
Other	3%	2%	-1 pp
Talib Bensouda	38%	40%	+2 pp

Perceived Frontrunners for the 2026 Presidential Election

Response	R1	R2	Change
Adama Barrow	31%	51%	+20 pp
Talib Bensouda	18%	12%	-6 pp
Ousainou Darboe	12%	23%	+11 pp
Essa Mbaye Faal	3%	1%	-2 pp
Mama Kandeh	3%	1%	-2 pp
Other	3%	1%	-2 pp
Undecided	29%	11%	-18 pp



NATIONAL
ENDOWMENT
FOR
DEMOCRACY

SUPPORTING FREEDOM AROUND THE WORLD